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IS NINTH CIRCUIT STANDARD 
"Most [labor] rules have undergone a continuous process of re-
finement and change, and some have enjoyed a particularly 
checkered career, being born in one period, laid to rest in an-
other, only to be resurrected, like the Phoenix, garbed in a 
slightly different plumage. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union, Lo-
cal 11 v. NLRB,2 the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (Board) to readopt an all-the-cir-
cum stances standard for determining whether an employer who 
questions employees about union activities commits an unfair la-
bor practice. In affirming the Board's decision to abandon its per 
se test of employee interrogations, the court noted that employer 
questioning is not necessarily coercive and that an all-the-cir-
cum stances standard allows the Board and administrative law 
judges to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether all the 
facts demonstrate coercive employer behavior.3 
1. D. Bok, Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38, 39 (1964). 
2. 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Solomon, D.J., United States Senior District 
Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation; other panel members were Alar-
con, J., and Kennedy, J.,concurring). 
3. 760 F.2d at 1009. In its rejection of the per se rule, the Board also overruled the 
following cases: PPG Industries Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980); Anaconda Co., 241 
N.L.R.B. 1091 (1979); Paceco, A Div. of Fruehauf, 237 N.L.R.B. 399 (1978); ITT Auto-
motive Electrical Products Division, 231 N.L.R.B. 878 (1977). See Rossmore House, 269 
N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984). 
251 
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II. FACTS 
In the summer of 1982, Warren Harvey was employed as a 
cook and waiter for Rossmore House, a residential retirement 
hotel owned by Shyr-Jim Tsay and managed by Ronald Tven-
strup. Harvey became interested in establishing a union at the 
retirement home and contacted representatives of the Hotel Em-
ployees and Restaurant Employees Union to arrange for an em-
ployee meeting at his house." 
Following the meeting, the union sent a mailgram to Ross-
more House notifying them that Harvey and another employee 
had formed a union organizing committee and that their activi-
ties were protected under the National Labor Relations Act.1i 
The content of a conversation between Tvenstrup and Harvey 
after Tvenstrup received the mailgram was disputed.6 
Tvenstrup testified that he approached Harvey with the 
mailgram in hand and asked, "Is this true?" to which Harvey 
replied affirmatively. Tvenstrup then said, "Okay, thank you" 
and proceeded to walk away, at which time Harvey stated, "I am 
sorry; it is nothing personal."7 
Harvey's version was that Tvenstrup walked into the 
kitchen waving the mailgram asking, "What is this about a 
union?" to which Harvey responded, "That's right about the 
union. We're going to have a union because of the lack of bene-
fits, lack of insurance, lack of job security, vacations without pay 
.... " Harvey further testified that Tvenstrup then stated that 
the owners "were not going to like it and that they would fight 
it, have to fight it to the hilt" and that as a manager Tvenstrup 
would have to fight it, too.8 
A second conversation occurred on August 7, 1982. Accord-
ing to Harvey's testimony, the owners approached him as he was 
4. Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984). 
5. See infra notes 13 and 14 and accompanying text. 
6. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176. The ALJ stated that he was unable to conclude whose version 
of the conversation was more accurate, but determined that "under either witness' testi-
mony his conclusion would be the same." [d. at 1176 n.4. 
7. [d. at 1176. 
8. [d. 
2
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leaving work. Tsay said, "The manager tells me you're trying to 
get a union in here," and asked why. Harvey replied that low 
pay, lack of benefits, and lack of job security were responsible. 
Tsay then asked if the union charged a fee to join. When Harvey 
said yes, Tsay said he would talk to the manager about it.9 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the interroga-
tions under either party's version of the facts to be violative of 
section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. 10 The Board 
disagreed, and in reversing the decision, overruled existing 
Board law supporting the ALJ's conclusions. 11 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES: THE ACT, THE BOARD, AND THE 
COURTS 
The National Labor Relations Act,12 popularly known as 
the Wagner Act, was passed by Congress in 1935. It was 
amended twelve years later when Congress, aspiring to balance 
the rights of employees and management, enacted the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947.13 
Prior to the 1947 amendments, which are frequently cited as 
the Taft-Hartley amendments after their legislative sponsors, 
the Act proscribed unfair labor practices committed only by em-
ployers.14 The amended Act, however, prohibits both employers 
and labor organizations from engaging In unfair labor 
9. [d. Harvey's employment was terminated by Tvenstrup, but for reasons other 
than his union activities. 760 F.2d at 1007. 
10. [d. Section 8(a)(1), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), states that "[iJt shall be an 
unfair labor practice for an employer to (1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees 
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) 
(1982). 
Section 7, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157, states in relevant part that "[eJmployees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). 
11. 269 N.L.R.B. at 1176. See supra note 3. 
12. National Labor Relations Act, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. ll§ 151-169 (1982». 
13. Labor-Management Relations Act, Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982». 
14. See National Labor Relations Act, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935). 
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practices. II! 
The agency responsible for processing unfair labor practice 
cases is the National Labor Relations Board. That agency is em-
powered "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair la-
bor practice . . . affecting commerce. "16 The principal compo-
nents of the Board are the five Board members and the General 
Counsel, each appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the SenateP 
The role of courts in reviewing decisions of the Board is a 
limited one. IS The courts of appeal are confined to determina-
tions of whether decisions are supported by substantial evidence 
on the record considered as a whole. Ie 
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 157(a), (b) (1982). 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). Although the Board is charged with disposing of cases 
once an action is filed, it is the responsibility of an employer, an employee, or a union to 
set the process in motion. That is done when one of the involved parties makes a deter-
mination that an unfair labor practice has occurred and files a charge with the office of 
the General Counsel. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). 
17. The General Counsel is responsible for investigating and processing unfair labor 
practice claims. Directors of regional offices of the General Counsel determine whether 
an unfair labor practice charge that has been filed has merit, and if so, issues a complaint 
charging that the Act has been violated. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982). 
After a complaint has been issued, there is a hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ). At the hearing, the General Counsel has the burden of proving that a viola-
tion of the Act has occurred. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ makes a recom-
mended report and order for the Board, which is not binding unless approved by the 
Board. If desired, either the charging party, the General Counsel, or the respondent has 
the right to appeal the ALJ's report to the Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). 
A decision by the Board may be appealed to a U.S. Court of Appeals in the district 
where an alleged unfair labor practice occurred, where the appealing party resides or 
transacts business, or in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. [d. If a 
respondent refuses to abide by the Board's decisiori, the general counsel may petition an 
appropriate court of appeals to enforce it. [d. 
18. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bon Hennings Logging Co., 308 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1978). The 
Ninth Circuit held that the Board's factual finding must be accepted if it is supported by 
substantial evidence. [d. at 553. 
19. See NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). The Supreme Court in 
Weingarten stated that "the Board has the special function of applying provisions of the 
Act to the complexities of industrial life ... and its special competence in the field is 
justification for the deference accorded its determination." [d. at 266. See also Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1950). In that decision the Supreme Court held 
that the Board's finding must be accepted if supported by substantial evidence on the 
record considered as a whole. [d. at 493. 
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B. SECTION 8(a)(1) AND EMPLOYEE INTERROGATIONS 
The first of the five employer unfair labor practices prohib-
ited under the Act is set forth in section 8(a)(1).20 That section 
requires that employers refrain from interfering with~ re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their collec-
tive bargaining rights.21 Since the passage of the Wagner Act, 
labor organizations have argued that employee interrogations 
automatically violate section 8(a)(1) because of their tendency to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees.22 In Standard-
Coosa- Thatcher, 23 the Board described employee interrogations 
as occurring "[w]henever an employer directly or indirectly at-
tempts to secure information concerning the manner in which or 
the extent to which his employees have chosen to engage in 
union organization or other concerted activity."24 
20. See supra note 10. 
21. The remaining employer unfair labor practices prohibit employers from domi-
nating or interfering with the formation or administration of any labor organization or 
contributing financial or other support to it (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2»; discriminating 
against employees in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation (id. § 158(a)(3)); discharging employees because of their having filed charges or 
given testimony under the Act (id. § 158(a)(4»; or refusing to bargain collectively (id. § 
158(a)(5». 
22. See Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949). In that decision the 
Board noted: 
ld. at 1362. 
[C)ases in which interrogated employees have been discharged 
or otherwise discriminated against on the basis of information 
obtained through interrogation are numerous. These cases 
demonstrate conclusively that, by and large, employers who 
engage in this practice are not motivated by idle curiosity, but 
rather by a desire to rid themselves of union adherents. 
23. 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949). 
24. ld. at 1360. More recently, an associate secretary of the Board noted that em-
ployers might be inclined to interrogate their employees for the following reasons: 
When an employer learns that an organizational campaign 
is going on among his employees, human nature being what it 
is, he's just bursting with curiosity to know whether any of his 
employees have joined, if there have been union meetings, who 
has attended them, and what was said. How'better can he find 
out than to ask his employees? There would be no problem for 
the employer or the Board if it could be established that such 
interrogation was purely motivated. Unfortunately for this 
point of view, experience has shown that in many cases such 
questioning is followed by reprisals against union adherents. 
H. KLEEB, TAFT-HARTLEY RULES DURING UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS. 55 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 114, 115 (1964). 
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Throughout the administration of the Wagner Act and early 
years of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the Board's policy was 
that employer interrogations of employees about any aspect of 
union activities or attitudes was a per se violation of section 
8(a)(1) of the Act.21i The Board's general belief was that such 
questioning, even standing alone, had restraining or coercive 
tendencies and was therefore unlawful. 26 During this period, 
general defenses to cases coming before the Board that a ques-
tion was isolated,27 prompted by idle curiosity,28 or by innocent 
or benign motives29 were rejected. 
The Board's application of its per se doctrine was, however, 
not without inconsistencies. Often the Board examined the sur-
rounding circumstances or the context in which an interrogation 
took place before concluding there had been a per se violation.30 
25. See Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949), where the Board con-
cluded as follows: 
In prohibiting interrogation ... we are not only preserving 
the employees' right to privacy in their union affairs; we are 
not only removing a subtle but effective psychological re-
straint on employees' concerted activities; but we are also 
seeking to prevent the commission of the further unfair labor 
practice of discrimination by condemning one of the first steps 
leading to such discrimination. 
Id. at 1362. Note that in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, the novel defense that since em-
ployees wore pro-union buttons they were openly professing their pro-union sympathies 
and thus could be properly interrogated in union matters was rejected by the Board. 
26. See, e.g., I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1951). In I.B.S. even though the 
Trial Examiner found a supervisor's interrogation of an employee concerning the latter's 
union membership "isolated," the Board held that the interrogation was not isolated in 
view of other unfair labor practices the employer had committed. Id. at 1265. 
27. See, e.g., Pecheur Lozenge Co., Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 496 (1952). The Board in 
Pecheur held that interrogation of employees concerning their union membership, even 
if standing in isolation, is a per se violation of section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Id. at 499. 
28. See, e.g., F.C. Russell Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 206 (1950). In that decision the Board 
rejected the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the interview and interrogations of the 
employees "was an endeavor to fraternize with the employees and to best place them in 
the organization of Respondent ... when he entered into any conversation with an em-
ployee it was more along the lines of friendship rather than acquiring knowledge to be 
used for an ulterior motive." Id. at 209. The Board was not concerned with motives in 
concluding that respondent's interrogations violated section 8(a)(1). Id. 
29. See, e.g., Dinion Coil Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1951). In Dinion, respondent 
claimed unsuccessfully that during periods of union organization "any plant manager 
who did not have general information as to what was going on would be both stupid and 
inefficient." Id. at 1437 n.5. 
30. See, e.g., Wilson and Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 882 (1951). The Board declined to find a 
violation of section 8(a)(1) in preelection questioning of 3 out of 1,200 employees regard-
ing their union sympathies, agreeing with the Trial Examiner that the questioning did 
not "form a pattern of conduct so clearly defined as to warrant a conclusion of violation 
6
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The Board occasionally found interrogation to be permissible 
when questioning was determined to be too isolated or casual to 
warrant per se treatment, or when some overriding necessity jus-
tified the questions.31 
The Board's basic stance that interrogation by an employer 
prevented employees from freely exercising their right to engage 
in concerted activities was, in most instances, enforced by the 
courts of appeals.32 Judicial support by the courts of the Board's 
per se policy continued until the late 1940s. 
Following the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments,33 
which ameliorated the rights of employers under the Act, courts 
increasingly became reluctant to follow the Board's per se ap-
proach. In the majority of circuits, courts started to examine the 
circumstances surrounding employee questioning to determine 
whether an employer's conduct reasonably tended to restrain or 
of the Act." Id. at 887. See also New Mexico Transportation Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 47 (1953). 
There the Board concluded that "[wJe are not convinced that, under the facts and cir· 
cumstances of this case, such an isolated act interferes with ... Section 8(a)(l) of the 
Act." Id. at 49. In that decision, respondent had asked an employee whether he had been 
invited to join the union and other questions such as "Do you think the Union can do 
more for you than I could?" Id. 
31. Note that interrogation was expressly allowed by the Board where an inquiry 
into union membership was necessary to the defense of unfair labor practice charges and 
it was strictly limited to the issues raised in the complaint. See Joy Silk Mills, 85 
N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949). See also Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 763 (6th 
Cir. 1965) (questions seeking to elicit information an employee gave to a Board agent 
constituted "[aJn indiscriminate inquiry which exceeded the necessities of the situa-
tion"); Stafford Operating Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1221 (1951) (no violation when an em-
ployer asked an employee union spokesman whether he was about to get "the union 
matter straightened out"); Keeskin Poultry, 97 N.L.R.B. 467, 472 (1951) (no violation 
was found when an employer asked what employees expected to have left out of their 
pay after government and the union each got their cut); U.S. Gypsum Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 
966, 968 (1951) (no violation found where an employer asked employees why they were 
wearing union buttons, because that was "an understandable impulsive reaction which 
did not intend to interfere with . . . employees within the meaning of ... the Act"). 
32. In its annual report for the year 1952, the Board noted as follows: 
In the great majority of the numerous cases involving 
questioning of employees regarding their union sympathies or 
membership, their participation in organizational activities, or 
their voting intentions in a pending Board election, the courts 
continued to sustain the Board's conclusion that such interro-
gation in the circumstances invaded the rights of employees 
guaranteed in section 7 of the act, and thus violated section 
8(a)( 1) of the act. 
17 NLRB ANN. REP. 224 (1952). 
33. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). 
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coerce employees.34 
A few years later, and in response to courts' unfavorable 
treatment of the per se rule,311 the Board itself rejected its per se 
policy. In the Blue Flash Express36 decision, the Board estab-
lished that "the test is whether, under all the circumstances, the 
interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act."37 The 
Board also stated that it agreed with and adopted the test laid 
down by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB u. Syra-
cuse Color Press,38 which the Board construed to be that "the 
answer to whether particular interrogation interferes with, re-
strains, and coerces employees must be found in the record as a 
whole."39 
Blue Flash involved an employer who wished to know how 
many employees had signed union authorization cards so that he 
would know how to respond to the union's claim of majority sta-
tus. The employer systematically polled each employee individu-
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 209 F.2d 596 (2nd Cir. 1954). The 
court stated that "since the Taft-Hartley Act became effective, interrogation of employ-
ees by an employer. . . which fall short of present threat or intimidation, or promise of 
favor or benefit as a reward for resistance to the union, are not unlawful." Id. at 601. 
35. The following cases are representative of decisions in their respective circuits, 
each finding that interrogation is not per se unlawful. See NLRB V. England Bros., 201 
F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1953); NLRB V. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 209 F.2d 593 (2nd Cir. 
1954); NLRB v. Clearwater Finishing Co., 203 F.2d 938 (4th Cir. 1953); Jacksonville Pa-
per CO. V. NLRB, 137 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 39 (6th 
Cir. 1952); NLRB V. Arthur Winer, Inc., 194 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 
U.S. 819; NLRB v. Protein Blenders, 215 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1954); Wayside Press, Inc. V. 
NLRB, 206 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1953); NLRB V. McCatron, 216 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1954); 
Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 136 (lOth Cir. 1952). C.r. NLRB V. Jackson Press, 
Inc., 201 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1953) and NLRB V. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902 (9th 
Cir. 1953), which indicated movement towards the per se rationale. But see Bochner V. 
NLRB, 180 F.2d 1021 (3rd Cir. 1950) and Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 
(D.C. Cir. 1950), where the per se rationale was upheld. 
36. 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954). 
37. Id. at 593. The Board also stated that "[w]e hereby repudiate the notion that 
interrogation per se is unlawful and overrule Standard-Coosc.-Thatcher and the line of 
cases following it to the extent they are inconsistent with our decision today," and noted 
that the courts of at least six circuits had explicitly or at least by necessary implication 
condemned the per se rationale. Id. 
38. 209 F.2d 596 (2nd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 966. In Syracuse, although 
the Board's per se rule was rejected, the court found employee interrogations unlawful 
because circumstances indicated questions had coercive effects. Id. 
39. 109 N.L.R.B. at 594. The Board did, however, distinguish the facts of the two 
cases. See infra text accompanying note 40. 
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ally in his office, stating first that it did not matter to him 
whether the employees were union members. In response to the 
union's objection, the Board noted that (1) the employer com-
municated his purpose for the interrogations to the employees 
and the purpose was legitimate, (2) the employer assured them 
of no reprisals, and (3) the interrogation occurred in an overall 
background free of union hostility.40 The Board emphasized, 
however, that all the circumstances must be evaluated in making 
a determination of whether an employee interrogation restrains 
or interferes with employees in the exercise of their rights under 
the Act.4l 
After the Blue Flash decision, consistency emerged in 
Board and court opinions concerning employee interrogations.42 
For the first time since the passage of the Wagner Act, both 
agreed that a consideration of the totality of the circumstances 
was necessary in assessing allegations of unlawful interrogation. 
In subsequent years, the Board and some circuits developed 
standards to be used in identifying the circumstances in which 
interrogation would be found unlawfu1.43 Where courts estab-
40. 109 N.L.R.B. at 593, 594. The Blue Flash majority also addressed the issue of 
casual or isolated "interrogations," voicing its objection that a per se analysis "would 
mean that a casual, friendly, isolated instance of interrogation by a minor supervisor 
would subject the employer to a finding that he had committed an unfair labor practice 
and result in the issuance of a cease and desist order .... " [d. at 595. The majority 
went on to state that if such a cease and desist order were enforced by the court, it 
"would subject the employer to punishment for contempt of court if the same or another 
minor supervisor repeated the question to the same or another employee." [d. 
41. [d. at 594. 
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. Roberts Brothers, 225 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1955). In Roberts, the 
court made the following general statement on changes justifying the Board's new 
position: 
[d. at 60. 
Some twenty years ago when the war over the unioniza-
tion of industry was at the critical stage, employees might well 
and with good reason have feared to reveal their union senti-
ment and might well have been swayed one way or another by 
an employer's statement as to his position on the subject. 
Now, labor and industry speak with equal dignity and it re-
quires something more than mere suspicion to read coercion 
into an employer's speech which, upon its face, is in all re-
spects within the proprieties. We think it is no longer proper 
to assume that the American employee is a craven individual 
afraid to stand up and express himself freely on the subject of 
his own welfare. 
43. See, e.g., Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir. 1964). There the court ex-
amined (1) an employer's background to determine whether the employer had a history 
9
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lished such standards they generally did so to facilitate their ap-
plication of the all-the-circumstances evaluation, not to create 
new tests to replace the all-the-circumstances rule.44 
In 1967 the Board developed a more restrictive test to be 
used when an employer systematically polled employees. In 
Struksnes Construction Co.,n the Board determined that in pol-
ling cases an employer violates section 8(a)(1) of Taft-Hartley 
unless (1) the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a 
union's claim of majority, (2) the purpose is communicated to 
the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are given, (4) the 
employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) an employer has 
not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coer-
cive atmosphere.46 The Struksnes polling rule has subsequently 
been adopted by most courts of appeals.47 
In further support for their rejection of the per se rule and 
adoption of an all-the-circumstances test, courts determined 
that "innocuous" questions were permissible under section 8(c) 
of the Act.48 That section states that the expressing of any 
views, argument, or opinion shall not constitute or be evidence 
of an unfair labor practice if such expression contains no threat 
of reprisal or promise of benefit.49 In NLRB u. Huntsuille,1JO the 
of hostility and discrimination, (2) the nature of the information sought, (3) the identity 
of the questioner, (4) the place and method of interrogation, and (5) the truthfulness of 
the reply. [d. at 48. The Ninth Circuit, in its application of the factors outlined in the 
Bourne decision, has noted that they are "helpful guidelines for dealing with the ques-
tion of whether an impermissible 'interrogation' has taken place." NLRB v. Hotel Con-
quistador, Inc., 398 F.2d 430, 434 (9th Cir. 1968). 
44. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rubin, 424 F.2d 748 (2nd Cir. 1970). In that decision, the 
court stated that "[w)e believe that under all the circumstances, the Bourne standards 
were met." [d. at 751. See infra note 46. 
45. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967). From the time of the Blue Flash decision until 1967, 
the Board used the same set of rules, the all-the-circumstances test, to evaluate the pol-
ling of many employees as it did to examine the interrogation of a single employee. See, 
e.g., NLRB v. Roberts Brothers, 225 F.2d 58, 60 (9th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Protein Blend-
ers, Inc., 215 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1954). But c.f. Struksnes Construction Co., 165 
N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967) (separate set of rules to evaluate the special problems surrounding 
polling cases). 
46. 165 N.L.R.B. at 1063. 
47. See, e.g., NLRB v. Super Toys, Inc., 458 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1972), a polling case 
in which the court stated that the "Board upheld the examiner's conclusion that respon-
dent did not comply with the requirements of Struksnes. We do too." [d. at 183. 
48. See, e.g., NLRB v. Huntsville Mfg. Co., 514 F.2d 723, 725 (5th Cir. 1975). 
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982). 
50. 514 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1975). 
10
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Fifth Circuit stated that "[w]e think that in the enforcement of 
the Act care should to taken not to render nugatory or meaning-
less the right of management to converse with employees."IH 
And in a more recent decision the Third Circuit, in Graham Ar-
chitectural Products v. NLRB,52 determined that "[i]f Section 
8(a)(1) of the Act deprived ... employers of any right to ask 
non-coercive questions of their employees during such a cam-
paign, the Act would directly collide with the Constitution."53 
Both the Board and the courts followed the all-the-circum-
stances standard until the late seventies when, without overrul-
ing Blue Flash or discussing why it declined to apply the Blue 
Flash test, the Board decided to restore the per se rule. In 
Paceco,54 the Board held that interrogation of any employee's 
union sympathies or his reasons for supporting a union reasona-
bly tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights 
under the Act and consequently is coercive. 55 The decision the 
Board cited as justification for its conclusion was American 
Freightways CO.,56 which relied on pre-Blue Flash standards 
when it enunciated that "[t]he test is whether the employer en-
gaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to in-
terfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the act."li7 
Further demonstrating a retreat from the Blue Flash all-
the-circumstances analysis the Board in PPG Industries58 held 
that employers could not lawfully question employees about 
their union activities even when the employees were open and 
known union supporters and the employer made no express 
threats or promises. 59 The PPG Board expressly overruled other 
cases to the extent that the cases held that open union sympa-
thizers may lawfully be questioned about their union views if 
51. [d. at 725. 
52. 697 F.2d 534 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
53. [d. at 541. Note that it would also collide with the protection of employer's 
'speech contained in the Act. See supra text accompanying notes 48 and 49. 
54. 237 N.L.R.B. 399 (1978), vacated and remanded in part, 601 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 
1979), supp. dec., 247 N.L.R.B. 1405 (1980). 
55. 237 N.L.R.B. at 399-400. 
56. 124 N.L.R.B. 146 (1959). 
57. [d. at 147 (citing NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 
1946». . 
58. 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980). 
59. [d. at 1147. 
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they are not threatened or given promises. so 
This sudden change in Board policy did not elicit much 
support in the courts. Cases were remanded to the Board for 
failure to consider circumstances relevant to alleged interroga-
tion violations,sl and the courts of appeals continued to rely on 
an all-the-circumstances standard for revlewmg employee 
interrogations.62 
The courts that had set particular standards to assist them 
in an all-the-circumstances evaluation also continued to apply 
those standards.63 Three Ninth Circuit decisions, J.M. Tanaka 
Construction, Inc. v. NLRB,64 NLRB v. Fort Vancouver Ply-
wood Co.,er. and Super Toys, Inc. v. NLRB,66 held that unless 
assurances against reprisal were given to questioned employees, 
questioning was coercive and thus violated the Act. Notably, 
however, in Tanaka and Fort Vancouver, the court relied on the 
requirements set forth in Super Toys, which was a polling case 
citing Struksnes with approval.67 As previously discussed, the 
60.Id. 
6!. See, e.g., Paceco v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1979). In Paceco, the court 
criticized the Board for not setting forth the legal standards by which it determined that 
an interrogation was coercive. Id. at 182, 183. See also Graham Architectural Products 
Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534, 541 (3rd Cir. 1983) (Board criticized for ignoring circum-
stances relevant to alleged interrogation violations). 
62. For cases in the Ninth Circuit, see NLRB v. Brooks Camera, 691 F.2d 912, 919 
(9th Cir. 1982); Lippinpott Industries v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 112, 114 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB 
v. Los Angeles New Hosp., 640 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1981); Silver Spur Casino, 623 
F.2d 571, 584 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981); Penasquitos Village, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1977). For cases in other circuits, see Graham 
Architectural Products Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534 (3rd Cir. 1983); Lord and Taylor v. 
NLRB, 703 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Ajax Tool Works, Inc. 713 F.2d 1307 (7th 
Cir. 1983). 
63. See, e.g., De1co-Remy Div., General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1295 (5th 
Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit found the following: 
Id. at 1311. 
Although an express statement of purpose as well as an ex-
press assurance of no reprisal may be desirable, [citation omit-
ted) such warning is not required when it is apparent from the 
circumstances, such as are present here, that the interrogation 
is for an innocent purpose and that the questions do not oth-
erwise convey a veiled threat of reprisal. 
64. 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982). 
65. 604 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 915 (1980). 
66. 458 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1972). 
67. Id. at 182, 183 (citing with approval Struksnes Construction Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 
1062 (1967)). 
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Struksnes criteria, which require that an employer give interro-
gated employees assurances against reprisals, were not estab-
lished for application to interrogation cases involving isolated 
questioning of employees.6s The Struksnes requirements were 
fashioned to address the special problems of systematic em-
ployer polls.69 
C. THE ROSSMORE HOUSE DECISION 
In 1984, possibly in an attempt to put an end to its conflict-
ing decisions and renewed disharmony with the courts, the 
Board returned to an all-the-circumstances standard for evaluat-
ing employee interrogations. In Rossmore House,7° the Board 
concluded that PPG Industries 
improperly established a per se rule that com-
pletely disregarded the circumstances surround-
ing an alleged interrogation and ignored the real-
ity of the workplace. Such a per se approach had 
been rejected by the Board 30 years ago when it 
set forth the basic test for evaluating whether in-
terrogations violate the Act: whether under all of 
the circumstances the interrogation reasonably 
tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights 
guaranteed by the Act.71 
The Board expressly overruled PPG and similar cases finding 
that an employer's questioning of open union supporters about 
their union sentiments, in the absence of threats or promises, 
68. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., RM.E., Inc., 171 N.L.RB. 213 (1968). In that decision the Board 
stated as follows: 
In view of the fact that Respondent did not systematically 
poll its employees as to how they expected to vote in the elec-
tion, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the Trial Examiner's 
reliance on Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 
1062, in finding that the interrogation of employees was 
coercive. 
Id. at 213 n.l. See also NLRB v. Lorben, Corporation, 345 F.2d 346 (2nd Cir. 1965). In 
Lorben, the Second Circuit noted that "[sltrict rules may not suit the casual question 
privately put to a few employees. But when the employer sets in motion a formal tabula-
tion of this sort, it is not too much to ask that he provide some explanation and assure 
his employees against reprisal." Id. at 350. 
70. 269 N.L.RB. 1176 (1984). 
71. Id. at 1177 (citing PPG Industries, 251 N.L.RB. 1146 (1980)). See supra notes 
58-60. 
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necessarily interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in vi-
olation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act.72 
The Board also noted that before PPG, it had declined to 
find violations in cases involving similar circumstances,73 and de-
clared that its view was consonant with that expressed by the 
Seventh Circuit in Midwest Stock Exchange v. NLRB and with 
the Third Circuit in Graham Architectural Products v. NLRB.74 
In reaching its conclusion that no violation of section 8(a)(1) 
of the Act had occurred, the Board considered that Warren Har-
vey was an active union supporter who openly declared his 
union ties, and that under the totality of the circumstances, the 
respondent's questions of Harvey were noncoercive. The Board 
dismissed the union's complaint in its entirety.711 
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION 
In a succinct discussion, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
72. [d. at 1177, 1178. 
73. The Board cited B.F. Goodrich Footwear Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 353 (1973), where no 
violation had been found when a supervisor asked two employees who were open union 
partisans how they felt about the union. Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. at 1177. 
74. [d. at 1177 (citing Midwest Stock Exchange v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 
1980) and Graham Architectural Products v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534 (3rd Cir. 1983)). In 
Midwest, the court concluded as follows: 
It is well established that interrogation of employees is 
not illegal per se. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits employ-
ers only from activity which in some manner tends to restrain, 
coerce or interfere with employee rights. To fall within the 
ambit of § 8(a)(1), either the words themselves or the context 
in which they are used must suggest an element of coercion or 
interference. 
635 F.2d 1255 at 1267. 
In Graham the court stated the following: 
Because production supervisors and employees often work 
closely together, one can expect that during the course of the 
workday they will discuss a range of subjects of mutual inter-
est, including ongoing unionization efforts. To hold that any 
instance of casual questioning concerning union sympathies 
violates the Act ignores the realities of the workplace. 
697 F.2d 534 at 541. 
75. Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. at 1178. Note that the dissent rejected the ma-
jority's claim that PPG established a per se rule, and felt that on the contrary, the ma-
jority established a per se rule stating that absent an accompanying threat of reprisal or 
promise of benefit, the interrogation of an open union adherent will not violate the Act. 
[d. (Zimmerman, J., dissenting). 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/14
1986] LABOR LAW 265 
that the Board's decision conflicted with some cases in which the 
Ninth Circuit held that employee interrogations are unlawful 
absent express assurances against reprisaL'6 The panel noted, 
however, that even in J.M. Tanaka Construction, Inc. v. 
NLRB,77 where a per se standard was espoused, the surrounding 
circumstances were examined before a coercive interrogation was 
found. 78 Also noted by the court was the large body of Ninth 
Circuit law upholding the all-the-circumstances test.7S 
In concluding that the Board acted within its province in 
returning to the all-the-circumstances test, the panel acknowl-
edged that an employer's questioning of an employee's union 
views is not necessarily coercive and may arise during casual 
conversation. The court noted that "[e]mployers often mingle 
with their employees, and union activities are a natural topic of 
conversation. "80 
The court also determined that a standard that considers 
the totality of the circumstances was a "realistic approach to the 
enforcement of section 8(a)(1)."81 The panel felt that such a 
standard is consistent with the Act because it allows the trier of 
fact to determine whether all the facts demonstrate coercive 
behavior. 
The court concluded that the Board correctly applied the 
all-the-circumstances test to the facts of the case, and that 
under either Tvenstrup's or Harvey's version of their conversa-
tion, Tvenstrup's inquiry was not coercive. Supporting this con-
clusion, the court noted that Harvey openly declared his activi-
ties with the union and, under the circumstances, Tvenstrup's 
and Tsay's questioning was not unlawfu1.82 
76. 760 F.2d at 1008 (citing J.M. Tanaka Construction, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029 
(9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980), and Super Toys Inc. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1972». 
But see supra text accompanying notes 67-69. 
77. 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982). 
78. 760 F.2d at 1008, 1009. 
79. [d. at 1009 (citing NLRB v. Brooks Camera, 691 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Lippincott Industries v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 112, 114 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Silver Spur 
Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 584 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981); and Penas-
quitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1977». 
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The concurring opinion, while supporting the majority's de-
cision, noted that the holding was not consistent with a broad 
statement in a recent case where the Ninth Circuit held that 
even when the Board has determined that a new rule is prefera-
ble, "it is irrational to discard an effective procedure."83 The 
concurring judge felt that confronted with the quoted statement 
in the context of Hotel Employees, the court must either apply 
the statement and reverse the Board, or announce it was dictum 
unnecessary to the decision from which it came. The concurring 
judge felt the latter course was the one that should be adopted, 
acknowledging however that "it is not a very good way to run 
the circuit."8. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The harm to employees caused by coercive employer ques-
tioning is generally not disputed. Although one study has shown 
that coercive tactics used by employers during union campaigns 
has no greater effect on employee behavior than lawful employer 
activity,811 few would argue that the practice of employer coer-
cion is permitted under the National Labor Relations Act, or 
even desirable. Clearly, coercive questioning can impede the col-
lective bargaining process and inhibit employees' rights guaran-
teed under the Act. Disputes then center on how to define coer-
cive questioning, on whether employer questioning of employees 
about union activities is justifiable under any circumstances, and 
on what rules to apply to what situations. 
Since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, the Board and 
courts have essentially proposed two different methods of han-
dling employer questioning of employees. The first is the per se 
doctrine. Under this policy, employers may not question em-
ployees concerning their union activities. If they do, employers 
will automatically be found in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the 
Act. The second is the all-the-circumstances test. Here, the law-
fulness of a question is determined based on an examination of 
83. [d. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Financial Inst. Employees of America v. 
NLRB, 752 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1984)) (employer refused to bargain with union when it 
had affiliated with another union). 
84. 760 F.2d at 1009 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
85. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: 
LAW AND REALITY 115-16, 126 (1976). 
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the circumstances surrounding the situation in which the ques-
tioning occurred. With regard to both tests, there have often 
been modifications to the all-the-circumstances test or excep-
tions to the per se rule that have been established by some 
courts and, on occasion, by the Board. These modifications or· 
exceptions have included guidelines created to assist the trier of 
fact in evaluating an alleged unlawful interrogation. 
Obviously, the per se approach is the least complicated to 
apply, and certainly it is the most judicially expeditious. Once a 
violation has been shown, the job is done; time is not wasted 
hearing lengthy explanations of why or under what circum-
stances the violation occurred. With good reason, however, the 
per se rule has been rejected by both the Board and the courts, 
and by the former more than once. 
The efficacy of a per se rule is limited by the ability of those 
who are charged with enforcing it to define properly the offend-
ing behavior. The Board in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, which 
held that employee interrogations are per se violations of the 
Act, described an employee interrogation as occurring 
"[w]henever an employer directly or indirectly attempts to se-
cure information concerning the manner in which or the extent 
to which his employees have chosen to engage in union organiza-
tion or other concerted activity."88 At first glance, the descrip-
tion seems satisfactory, a precise and reasonable means of deter-
mining employer misconduct. A closer look, however, reveals 
that the description does not comport with the language of the 
statute. Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from interfering 
with, restraining, or coercing employees, not from attempting to 
secure information from them.87 
When the Board in Blue Flash Express overruled Stan-
dard-Coosa-Thatcher, it did not reformulate a definition of em-
ployer interrogation. It did, however, insist on analyzing em-
ployer questioning to determine whether, under all the 
circumstances, it reasonably tended to interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by 
the Act.88 If the Board had gone one step further and redefined 
86. 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360 (1949). See supra text accompanying note 23. 
87. See supra note 10. 
88. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
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employee interrogation so as to require that employer behavior 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees, the Board may 
have been able to continue a per se policy, for then there would 
be no doubt that all employee interrogations, once established, 
violate the Act. A determination of whether an employee inter-
rogation occurred might then be made not by inquiring whether 
an employer questioned employees, but rather by inquiring 
about the nature, intent, or effect of the questions asked of 
them. But instead of developing a definition that conformed to 
requirements of the Act, the Board in PPG Industries, like the 
Board in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, viewed the process of em-
ployer questioning of employees on union activities as inherently 
coercive, reserving the right, however, to carve out exceptions 
whenever questions seemed too isolated, casual, benign, or oth-
erwise inconsequential to warrant per se treatment.89 
This is a poor way to handle the problem. In addition to 
creating so many exceptions to the rule that the rule becomes, as 
one court has termed it, nugatory,90 a policy that insists that 
there can be no legitimate purpose to an employer's questioning 
employees on union matter simply has no basis under the stat-
ute. As the cases have revealed, the Board and courts have wres-
tled with this conflict by frequently examining surrounding cir-
cumstances anyway before making a per se determination.91 An 
example is J.M. Tanaka Construction, Inc. v. NLRB, where the 
Ninth Circuit stated that interrogations are "inherently suspect 
and coercive . . . unless express assurances against reprisals are 
given."92 In that decision, however, the court considered the cir-
cumstances surrounding the interrogations, including the com-
pany's "pattern of hostility toward the union."93 
There are also practical problems with applying a per se 
rule. Such a rule fails to consider the employee who initiates a 
conversation about union activities with a supervisor, and 
whether such a supervisor would be obliged to keep silent, to 
walk away, or to change the subject. In addition, an employer 
89. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
90. NLRB v. Huntsville, 514 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1975). See supra text accompanying 
note 50. 
91. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
92. 675 F.2d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 1982). 
93. [d. 
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frequently receives notification, as in Hotel Employees, that em-
ployees are commencing union organizing activities. A literally 
applied per se rule against employee interrogations effectively 
forbids an employer from verifying the validity of any such noti-
fication received. For example, in Hotel Employees, under either 
version of the alleged interrogation occurring on August 1,94 the 
questioning seemed to have been no more than an attempt by 
the employer to verify the mailgram informing the employer of 
union activity. Applying the per se rule, however, the ALJ found 
the "interrogation" unlawful under the Act.9C1 
Finally, if the per se rule deprives employers of the right to 
ask non-coercive questions of their employees during a union or-
ganizing campaign, the rule imposes a chilling effect on speech, 
prohibited by both the first amendment98 and section 8(c) of the 
Act.97 It is thus essential that union related conversations be-
tween employers and employees be specifically found coercive 
before they are prohibited, rather than categorized as coercive 
until proven otherwise. As already noted, the per se rule does 
not provide that such a finding will be made before an interroga-
tion is called coercive, despite assurances offered by the dissent 
in Blue Flash that "[t]here are, of course, instances of interroga-
tion which can be properly regarded as isolated, casual, and too 
inconsequential in their impact to constitute a violation of the 
Act or to warrant a Board remedy."9s As the cases have shown, 
the Board has often rejected, without examining the surrounding 
circumstances, employers' defenses that allegedly offending in-
terrogations were isolated or casua1.99 
In view of its inadequacies, it is not difficult to support the 
Ninth Circuit in its rejection of the per se analysis in favor an 
all-the-circumstances test. Although the new rule replaces a sup-
posed "bright line" standard with a test that demands a case-by-
case analysis of whether behavior may be properly considered 
unlawful, any additional effort spent on such an analysis is 
clearly preferable to perpetuating a rule that condemns activity 
94. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
95. See Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 1176 n.4 (1984). 
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
97. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
98. 109 N.L.R.B. 593 at 597. 
99. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
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that may not genuinely interfere with employees' rights. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In one sense, there is little practical distinction between the 
all-the-circumstances test and the per se rule. A practitioner 
must, in counseling an employer on behavior during an organiza-
tional campaign, advise a client to avoid altogether questioning 
employees about their union activities, much as though a per se 
rule were still in effect. This is not because, as the per se policy 
proclaims, all employer questioning is inherently coercive. It is 
because employers can, and without necessarily realizing it, eas-
ily overstep the bounds of noncoercive behavior and use their 
natural advantage to interfere with employees' organizational 
activities. 
In another sense, the new rule differs greatly from the per se 
test. Unlike the per se doctrine, it forces those alleging unfair 
labor practices to prove that an infraction has occurred and hon-
ors the fact that the Act forbids coercive employer questions, 
not all employer questions. 
Lynne Avakian * 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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LABOR LAW 
NLRB v. BEST PRODUCTS CO.: IS THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT BURNING DOWN THE 
BARN TO GET RID OF THE RATS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In NLRB u. Best Products CO.I the Ninth Circuit enforced a 
National Labor Relations Board (Board) order requiring Best 
Products to bargain with the United Food and Commercial 
Workers Local 428.2 The court ruled that a representation elec-
tion would not be set aside based on an imbalance in the num-
ber of employer and union observers because the employer was 
given the opportunity to provide an additional observer but de-
clined to do SO.3 The court also adopted a rule that campaign 
misrepresentations which fell short of the use of forged docu-
ments did not warrant setting aside an election;' Voters were 
able to recognize these misrepresentations as propaganda and 
were not misled by them.1I 
1. 765 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Wiggins, J.; the other panel members were Hall, 
J. and Smith, D.J., United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by 
designation). 
2. [d. at 905. 
3. [d. at 908. 
4. [d. at 913 (citing Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 131 
(1982». In Midland, campaign literature distributed by the employer to its employees on 
the day before the election was found by the NLRB to contain material misrepresenta-
tions designed to portray the union as ineffectual and unionization as leading to plant 
closures. The Board, however, refused the petition of the union to set the election aside 
because forgery of documents was not involved. 263 N.L.R.B. at 133. 




Avakian and Henze: Labor Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
272 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:271 
II. FACTS 
A. THE ELECTION CHALLENGE 
On June 3, 1982, a consent election was held among Best 
Products' sixty-nine sales and warehouse workers at its Camp-
bell, California facilities. 8 The union, Local 428 of the United 
Food and Commercial Workers, won a majority of the votes 
cast.' The employer immediately filed two objections to the elec-
tion with the NLRB. First, Best alleged that the Board Agent 
supervising the election violated the pre-election consent agree-
ment when he allowed the union to use two election observers 
while the employer had only one observer available.S Second, it 
charged that the union had engaged in campaign misrepresenta-
tions.9 The employer argued that these flaws in the election were 
so prejudicial to the possibility of a fair election that the vote 
should be set aside. 10 
B. THE BOARD'S DECISION 
Best's challenges to the election were investigated by the 
NLRB Regional Director, utilizing the standard handed down 
on August 4th, 1982 in the Board's decision in Midland Na-
tional Life Insurance Company.ll Based on this rule, the Re-
gional Director dismissed the misrepresentations challenge and 
6. 765 F.2d at 905-06. A consent election is one in which the details of the election, 
such as date, place, and voter list are agreed upon by the parties without the need of a 
formal hearing and decision by the Board. 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (1985). In Best Products, 
the "Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election" signed by the employer, the 
union, and Board representatives provided that "each party ... will be allowed to sta-
tion an equal number of authorized observers ... at the polling places during the elec-
tion to assist in its conduct, to challenge the eligibility of voters and to verify the tally." 
765 F.2d at 905-06. 
7. [d. at 906. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. at 909. The alleged misrepresentations were: that Local 428 falsely compared 
the wages at Best with those of a unionized competitor; that the union falsely alleged 
that Best had threatened to close the store and to reopen with non-union employees if 
the union won; and that the union falsely stated that the union had filed an unfair labor 
practice charge against Best. [d. 
10. [d. at 906. 
11. [d. (citing Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 131 (1982)). 
The NLRB Regional Director investigated Best's objections and on June 26, 1982, issued 
a "Report and Recommendations on Objections" in which he ordered a hearing. 765 F.2d 
at 906. 
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ordered a hearing only on the challenge concerning the number 
of observers.12 At the hearing this objection was also denied and 
the election was certified. IS Best then refused to bargain with 
the newly certified union.u The instant case reached the Ninth 
Circuit when the Board filed a petition seeking judicial enforce-
ment of its order that Best cease violating sections 8(a)(1) and 
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Actlli and commence 
bargaining with the union.16 
III. BACKGROUND 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted to 
~nsure that employees have the right to self-organize, to form 
unions, to bargain collectively, and to engage in other concerted 
acts for mutual aid and protection.17 Under section 9 of the Act, 
a union certification election is conducted when a group of em-
ployees file a petition and the Board is convinced that a ques-
tion of representation exists. IS If a majority of the employees 
vote in favor of unionization, the union selected gains the right 
to be the exclusive representative of the employees for collective 
bargaining over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.19 Section 8 of the Act proscribes any conduct by 
the employer or the union which disrupts the possibility of em-
ployee free choice during the campaign.20 
12. 765 F.2d at 906. When the Midland case was decided by the Board on August 4, 
1982, the Director issued a supplemental report noting that only the imbalance in ob-
servers objection would be heard. At the hearing, held on March 7, 1983, the hearing 
officer concluded that Best's objections should be overruled and the union certified. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. at 905-06. The employer filed objections to this report but on March 28, 
1984, the Board upheld the hearing officer's decision. The employer then refused to bar-
gain. Local 428 filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. The Board con-
cluded that Best had violated sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. It ordered Best 
to cease these violations and commence bargaining with the union. [d. 
15. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(a)(I), 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 
158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(l) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to organize under section 7 of 
the Act. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse to 
bargain collectively with representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(I), 
158(a)(5) (1976). 
16. 765 F.2d at 905. 
17. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
18. [d. § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. §§ 8(a)(I), 8(a)(5), 8(b)(l), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5), 158(b)(I). Sec-
23
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While the NLRA set out this general framework, Congress 
left the NLRB with the task of developing detailed regulations 
for running union certification elections.21 Utilizing this man-
date, the Board has developed comprehensive guidelines both 
through official regulations and through case law. Two general 
areas of these guidelines were at issue in Best Products: the reg-
ulation of the number of observers used by either party at the 
polling place and the standard to be applied in judging cam-
paign misrepresentations.22 
The NLRB's key policies concerning observers are set forth 
in several of its official regulation manuals.23 The regulations 
provide that each party will be allowed to station observers at 
the polling places in order to identify voters.24 They also allow 
the use of more than one observer per side, even in a small elec-
tion.21i The tasks of the observers are uncomplicated and the 
Board Agent can properly train them within minutes of the 
election.28 
tion 8(a)(l) states that "[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 
Section 8(a)(5) states that "[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to re-
fuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .... " Section 
8(b)(l) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to re-
strain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 158(a)(I), 158(a)(5), 158(b)(l) (1976). 
21. NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940). The court stated that 
the "control of the election proceeding, and the determination of the steps necessary to 
conduct that election fairly [arel matters which Congress entrusted to the Board alone." 
[d. 
22. 765 F.2d at 905. 
23. E.g., NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART Two) REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS 
(April 1984) [hereinafter cited as NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL); NLRB, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE, SERIES 8, As AMENDED (1982); OFFICE OF 
THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION 
CASES (June 1974). See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.19, 102.69(a) (1984) (section 101.19 sets out 
the NLRB's policies concerning consent elections; section 102.69 discusses Board proce-
dures for conducting certification elections; each of these regulations authorizes the use 
of observers). 
24. E.g., NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 23, 1111,310 (1984)."Each party 
may be represented at the polling places by an equal, predesignated number of observ-
ers." [d. 
25. [d. "There may be one observer per party per checking table and one observer 
per party at the ballot box, plus observers necessary for relief, ushering, and other assis-
tance." [d. 
26. [d. at 11 11,318. "The Board agent(s) and observers should assemble at the pol-
ling place from 15 to 45 minutes (depending on the complexity of the election) prior to 
the opening of the polls .... Substitutes should be procured for absentees." [d. "If this 
has not already been done, a copy of the Instructions to Observers, Form NLRB-722, 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/14
1986] LABOR LAW 275 
The NLRB has interpreted these regulations concerning 
election observers in several leading decisions. In Westinghouse 
Appliance Sales and Service Co., a Division of Westinghouse 
Electric Corp.,n the Board Agent had allowed the union to sta-
tion two observers at the polling place even though the employer 
had only one observer available.28 The Board upheld the validity 
of the election, reasoning that this imbalance did not create the 
impression that the Board favored the union.29 Nor was actual 
favoritism found, since the agent specifically advised the em-
ployer of his right to provide an additional observer.3o 
However, in Summa Corp. v. NLRB,31 the court refused to 
enforce an NLRB bargaining order because of an imbalance in 
the number of employer and union observers at a representation 
election.32 The Board Agent had consented to an additional 
union observer without consulting the observers for the em-
ployer.33 The court felt that this materially affected the election 
process because it created the impression of union predominance 
and favoritism on the part of the Board.34 
Similarly, in Barceloneta Shoe Corp.,3r. the Board set aside 
an election due to an imbalance in the number of observers.3o 
The union and the employer had entered into a consent agree-
ment allowing each party to designate an equal number of ob-
servers.3? However, the employer later refused to allow an em-
ployee it had unlawfully discharged to serve as an observer.38 
The Board deemed the consent agreement to be a contract, and 
the denial of a party's contractual right to designate and use the 
employee of its choice as an observer to be an infringement of a 
should be given to each observer. He/she should be given the opportunity to read it and 
ask additional questions. The observers should be instructed as to their specific tasks of 
the day." Id. 11 11,318.2. 
27. 182 N.L.R.B. 481 (1970). 
28. Id. at 481 n.1. 
29.Id. 
30.Id. 
31. 625 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1980). 
32. Id. at 295. 
33.Id. 
34. Id. at 295-96. 
35. 171 N.L.R.B. 1333 (1968). 
36. Id. at 1334. 
37.Id. 
38. Id. at 1335. 
25
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material term of the contract which warranted setting aside the 
result of the consent election.39 
The second area of the NLRB's guidelines at issue in Best 
Products concerned the standard to be applied in judging the 
effects of misrepresentations on the fairness and impartiality of 
election campaigns.·o In the past twenty years the Board has 
taken a seesaw approach, changing its policy on four different 
occasions.41 In 1962, in Hollywood Ceramics CO.,42 the Board 
held that a representation election would be set aside if one 
party had engaged in substantial misrepresentations just before 
election time, reasoning that these misrepresentations would 
have a significant impact on the vote and the other party would 
not have sufficient time to make an effective reply."3 
Fifteen years later, in Shopping Kart Food Market," the 
Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics and decided that misrep-
resentations of fact alone would no longer suffice as a reason to 
set aside a representation election.411 The Board held that an 
election would be set aside only if a party has used forged docu-
ments or improperly involved the Board so as to destroy the 
39. [d. at 1343. 
40. 765 F.2d at 910-11. 
41. [d. at 910. 
42. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). On the afternoon before the election, the union distrib-
uted a handbill to the employees containing a table purporting to compare wage rates at 
the Hollywood Ceramics plant with those at unionized ceramics plants. The comparison 
was misleading in that it included a 30 % incentive payment for the unionized plants but 
failed to include an existing incentive plan for the employer's plant. Furthermore, the 
plants used as comparison were not truly comparable in type of operations and degree of 
skill. [d. at 222-23. 
43. [d. at 224. The Board stated that its general policy is to maintain "laboratory 
conditions" under which employees can exercise their right to choose their own repre-
sentatives. [d. at 223. A vague or inartistic representation will not necessarily disturb the 
setting and will not require an election to be set aside. [d. at 224. However, when a 
misrepresentation is substantial and would be likely to have a real impact on the elec-
tion, the bounds of fair lawful electioneering are exceeded and the free choice of employ-
ees is interfered with. Therefore, a second election should be conducted. [d. at 226. 
44. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). In Shopping Kart, on the evening before the election, 
the union vice president told the employees that the employer had made a profit of 
$500,000 in the past year when in fact the profit had been only $50,000. [d. at 1311. 
45. [d. at 1313. The Board stated that the Hollywood Ceramics rule had been based 
on a false view of the employees as "naive," "unworldly," and in need of protection from 
misrepresentations. [d. In rejecting this view, the Board stated that "Board rules in this 
area must be based on a view of employees as mature individuals who are capable of 
recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting it." [d. 
26
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possibility of employee free choice.46 
The Board interpreted the phrase "improperly involving the 
Board and its processes," later that same year, in Formco, Inc.47 
In Formco, the union had falsely reported that the employer had 
been found guilty of unfair labor practices.48 The Board held 
that these false reports improperly involved the Board and im-
plied that the Board had endorsed the union in the election.49 
On this basis, the union's election victory was set aside. IiD 
Only a scant twenty months later, the Board overturned the 
new Shopping Kart standard in General Knit of California, 
Inc. IiI The Board held that misrepresentations of fact affect the 
way that employees vote and undermine the integrity of the 
election process. Ii2 The Board stated that it had a responsibility 
to ensure employee free choice and thus it was returning to the 
Hollywood Ceramics standard of tight regulation. Ii3 
The Board's latest policy reversal occurred in August 1982 
in Midland National Life Insurance CO.Ii4 Once again the Board 
returned to the reasoning in Shopping Kart and overruled Gen-
eral Knit and Hollywood Ceramics.Ii li The Board put forth what 
46. [d. The Board reasoned that the Hollywood Ceramics rule had actually impeded 
employee free choice by leading to extensive Board analysis of campaign propaganda, 
restriction of free speech, and widely varying standards of application. [d. at 1312. 
47. 233 N.L.R.B. 61 (1977). 
48. [d. at 62. 
49. [d. The Board decided that this constituted substantial mischaracterization and 
misuse of a Board document for partisan election purposes. [d. at 61. 
50. [d. at 61. Since the Board is consistent in "jealously guarding against any intru-
sion or abuses of its processes" for fear that this will place the Board's neutrality in 
question, this misrepresentation warranted setting aside the election. [d. at 62. 
51. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). In General Knit, the union had distributed a leaflet to 
the employees on election day which stated that the company had earned a profit of 
$19.3 million in 1976 when in fact it had sustained a loss of more than $5 million. [d. at 
619. 
52. [d. at 621. 
53. [d. at 623. The NLRB Regional Director had considered and rejected the em-
ployer's election objections, utilizing the Shopping Kart standard. [d. at 619. However, 
the Board declined to enforce his order and remanded the case to have the Regional 
Director investigate the facts further under the old Hollywood Ceramics standard. [d. at 
624. 
54. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). In Midland, the Board refused to set aside an election 
where the employer misrepresented the effects unionization would have because the use 
of forged documents was not involved. [d. at 133. 
55. [d. at 129. 
27
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has become known as the Midland rule: 
[W]e will no longer probe into the truth or falsity 
of the parties campaign statements ... no[r] set 
elections aside on the basis of misleading cam-
paign statements. We will, however, intervene in 
cases where a party has used forged documents 
which render the voters unable to recognize prop-
aganda for what it is.56 
In effect, the Board had returned to the hands off standard 
of Shopping Kart. However, the Board went even a step further 
towards deregulation in its decision in Affiliated Midwest Hos-
pital, Inc. 57 This case held that mischaracterizations of Board 
actions should not be equated with physical alteration of a 
Board document. 58 By themselves these mischaracterizations 
should be treated no differently than any other misrepresenta-
tions.59 Thus false allegations that one party to the election had 
been found guilty of unfair labor practices would not rise to the 
level of "improperly involving the Board and its processes." 
Formco, Inc. was therefore expressly overruled.60 
The Board's adoption of the Midland rule and its standard 
of election deregulation has not gone uncriticized by the federal 
circuits. In NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc.,61 the 
Board had applied the Midland rule and rejected the employer's 
misrepresentation challenges to an election.62 The First Circuit 
enforced the Board's order requiring the employer to bargain.63 
A concurring opinion agreed with the instant result, since it 
56. Id. at 133. 
57. 264 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1982). In Midwest Hospital, the union distributed a leaflet 
stating that "the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board found reason-
able cause that the Hospital had violated the law." Id. In fact a nonadmission settlement 
had been agreed to and no Board complaint had ever been issued. Id. 
58. Id. at 1095. 
59.Id. 
60. Id. The Board reasoned that statement that the Board had issued a complaint 
against the employer did not convey to the employees the impression that the Board 
favors one party in the election. Otherwise, even truthful statements to this effect would 
have to be barred. Id. 
61. 720 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1983). 
62. Id. at 729. The employer alleged that a letter sent by the union to employees 
falsely stated that the union was financially solvent when in fact the local's balance sheet 
showed liabilities equal to three times its total assets. Id. 
63.Id. 
28
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found the misrepresentation not material, but it criticized the 
general application of the Midland rule as providing virtually 
unbridled license and creating a strong temptation to tell last 
minute lies.64 It characterized the new Midland rule as "burning 
down the barn to get rid of the rats; an abnegation of the 
Board's recognized duty to ensure a fair and free choice of 
bargaining. "6C1 
Van Dom Plastic Machinery Co. v. NLRB66 involved a 
charge by the employer that an election should be set aside be-
cause of a wage misrepresentation contained in a union flyer dis-
tributed shortly before the election.67 Like the court in New Co-
lumbus, the Sixth Circuit was reluctant to wholeheartedly 
endorse the Midland rule.6S While it applied the rule to the case 
before it and dismissed the employer's election challenge, the 
court left open the question of whether it would uphold the ap-
plication of the rule to situations where the misrepresentation 
was more artful and deceptive, where the employees could not 
separate truth from falsehood, and where their right to a free 
and fair election would be jeopardized.69 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE IMBALANCE IN THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the union's request to use 
two observers only minutes before the election was to begin was 
neither contrary to established Board procedures nor a violation 
of the pre-election consent agreement.70 Even in a small election 
the parties are each allowed more than one observer as an aid in 
identifying voters.71 Similarly, the consent agreement provided 
only that each side would have an equal number of observers.72 
It did not place absolute limits on the number of observers.73 
64. Id. at 730 (Aldrich, J. concurring). 
65. Id. The concurring opinion cited New York Times v. Sullivan, to support its 
view that protection of free speech has never extended to intentionally false, material 
misstatements. [d. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964». 
66. 736 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1173. 
67. [d. at 345. 
68. [d. at 348. 
69. [d. 
70. 765 F.2d at 907. 
71. See, NLRB; CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 23, 1111 11,310, 11,318 (1984). 
72. 765 F.2d at 907. 
73. [d. 
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The Board Agent conducting the election gave the employer the 
opportunity to use a second observer as well. The employer's re-
fusal to provide a second observer reflected its own free choice 
and, according to the court, was not grounds for overturning the 
election.7• 
The court distinguished the facts in Best Products from 
those in Summa Corp. v. NLRB71i and Barceloneta Shoe Corp.76 
which the employer had contended were controlling.77 In 
Summa, the Board Agent had shown actual favoritism by al-
lowing the union to use an additional observer without first con-
sulting with the employer.78 But any appearance of favoritism 
due to the imbalance in observers in Best Products was of the 
employer's own making.79 In Barceloneta, the election was set 
aside when one party violated the consent agreement by refusing 
to allow a certain employee to serve as an observer.8o By con-
trast, in providing two observers, the union in Best Products was 
simply exercising a right given to it by the consent agreement.81 
Thus the court reasoned that the election process was not signif-
icantly impaired by this action and the Board's decision not to 
set aside the election on this basis must be supported.82 
B. THE MISREPRESENTATION ISSUE 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Board's decision to util-
ize the standard set out in Midland National Life Insurance 
CO.8S to analyze the misrepresentation challenge.84 The court 
found that the rule summarily disposed of the instant case, be-
74. [d. at 907. In San Francisco Bakery Employer Association, the employer re-
fused to let a union observer leave work during the election to serve at the polls. 121 
N.L.R.B. 1204, 1206 (1958). However, the Board refused to Bet aside the election because 
the resultant imbalance in observers was due to the union's own lack of diligence in 
failing to make prior arrangements with the employer to allow for the employee's release 
from work. [d. at 1206. 
75. 625 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1980). 
76. 171 N.L.R.B. 1333 (1968). 
77. 765 F.2d at 908. 
78. 625 F.2d at 295. 
79. 765 F.2d at 908 n.6. 
80. 171 N.L.R.B. at 1335. 
81. 765 F.2d at 908. 
82. [d. 
83. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). 
84. 765 F.2d at 913. 
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cause neither forgery nor improper involvement of the Board 
were involved.811 
In approving the NLRB's development of the Midland rule, 
the Ninth Circuit found that the new standard was rational and 
consistent with the NLRA.88 The rule was based both on the 
NLRB's own past experience under the standards of Hollywood 
Ceramics CO.,87 Shopping Kart Food Market,88 and General 
Knit of California, inc.,89 as well as on empirical studies and the 
views of academic specialists.90 In particular, the court put great 
weight on a study by Professor Julius Getman of Indiana Uni-
versity and Professor Stephen Goldberg of Northwestern Uni-
versity.91 This study found that employees generally paid very 
little attention to the content of election propaganda and that 
the votes of the vast majority of the employees could be cor-
rectly predicted from their precampaign intent and their atti-
tudes about unions and working conditions in genera1.92 The 
Ninth Circuit accepted the conclusion of the study that Board 
supervision of the content of election propaganda operated more 
to frustrate employee free choice than to ensure it.93 Thus the 
court held that the deregulation inherent in the Midland rule 
struck a proper balance between the principle of majority rule 
and the opposing principles of ensuring certainty and finality of 
the election by preventing dilatory attacks upon the results.9• 
85. Id. at 910. 
86. Id. at 912. 
87. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). 
88. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). 
89. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). 
90. 765 F.2d at 912-13. 
91. Getman and Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying N.L.R.B. Reg-
ulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 
263 (1976). The authors selected 31 union election campaigns where there was likely to 
be vigorous and possibly unlawful campaigning. Id. at 265. They interviewed individual 
employees at different stages of the campaign asking them how they intended to vote 
and ultimately how they did vote. Id. at 266-67. In 22 of the 31 elections the NLRB later 
found that unlawful campaigning did in fact occur. Id. at 265. 
92. 765 F.2d at 912 (citing Getman and Goldberg, supra note 91, at 276-79). 
93. 765 F.2d at 912 (citing Getman and Goldberg, supra note 91, at 283). 
94. 765 F.2d at 912 (citing NLRB v. Berryfast, Inc., 741 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1984». 
In Berryfast, the union won a representation election by one vote. 741 F.2d at 1162. The 
employer argued that the election should be set aside because an eligible pro-company 
voter had been disenfranchised through no fault of her own. Id. But the Board found 
that the employee did not take reasonable steps to vote because she neither went to the 
polling place nor sought out the Board Agent to find out why her name was not on the 
voting list. The Board balanced the need to assure that all eligible employees have a 
31
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The court concluded that since there was a reasonable basis in 
law for the Board's change of policy to the Midland rule, defer-
ence should be given to the Board's decision to effect that 
change.911 
In applying the new rule to the instant case, the court re-
jected Best's argument that an exception to Midland should be 
carved out here due to the nature of the union's misrepresenta-
tions.96 The court noted that Formco, Inc., upon which the em-
ployer relied, had been expressly overruled by the NLRB in Af-
filiated Midwest Hospital, Inc. 97 The court accepted the Board's 
reasoning in Midwest Hospital that while forged Board docu-
ments would confuse the voters, simple misrepresentations of 
Board actions would not.98 The Board's actions would speak for 
themselves and reveal any misrepresentations to be false.99 Since 
no forgery was involved in this case, under a Midwest Hospital 
analysis, the employer's election objections had no merit. loo 
The Ninth Circuit also distinguished the nature of the mis-
representations in the instant caselOI from those facing the Sixth 
Circuit in Van Darn Plastic Machinery Co. v. NLRBI02 and the 
First Circuit in New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc. loa The court 
chance to vote against the competing policy of promptly completing election proceedings 
and decided to uphold the election. Id. 
95. 765 F.2d at 913 (citing NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Corp., 454 
U.S. 170 (1981)). In Hendricks, the issue involved the Board's practice of "excluding 
from collective bargaining ·units only those confidential employees with a 'labor nexus' 
while rejecting any claim that all employees with access to confidential information are 
beyond the reach of [the NLRA) .... " 454 U.S. at 176. The Supreme Court upheld the 
Board's policy, reasoning that the Court should normally defer to an administrative 
agency's construction of a statute which it is charged with executing. Id. at 177. This is 
proper as long as there is a reasonable basis in law for this construction. Id. at 176. 
96. Id. at 912. Local 428 made false statements that Best had threatened to close 
the store if the union prevailed and that Local 428 had filed an unfair labor practice 
charge in response. Id. at 909. Best argued that these statements constituted improperly 
involving the Board and its processes and thus justified Board involvement. Id. at 911. 
97. Id. (citing Affiliated Midwest Hospital, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1095 (1982)). 
98. 765 F.2d at 911 (citing Affiliated Midwest Hospital, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1094, 
1095 (1982)). 
99. 264 N.L.R.B. at 1095. 
100. 765 F.2d at 911 (citing Affiliated Midwest Hospital, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1094, 
1094 (1982)). 
101. 765 F.2d at 911-12 n.9. See also text accompanying notes 50-58 (explaining the 
criticisms of Midland by the First and Sixth Circuits). 
102. 736 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984). 
103. 720 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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found that the union misrepresentations in Best Products fell 
far short of the all pervasive lying that had concerned the other 
circuits. l04 Thus there was no need for the Ninth Circuit to con-
sider carving out an exception to Midland here. 1011 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the employer's argument 
that the new Midland rule should not be applied retroactively to 
the instant case. lOB Although Midland was decided two months 
after the election in Best Products, the new rule was issued 
before the Board had ruled on Best's election challenges. l07 Thus 
the Board utilized the Midland standard in analyzing the em-
ployer's objections. lOB In reviewing the Board's decision, the 
Ninth Circuit, therefore, was not retroactively applying a new 
rule to a Board decision based on the old standard. lOB Even 
though the court's use of the Midland rule could be considered 
retroactive application, the Ninth Circuit felt that it was proper 
to apply the new rule because appellate courts ordinarily utilize 
the law in effect at the time of the appellate decision. no While a 
court would normally remand the case to the administrative 
agency which has changed its policy to decide if the new rule 
should be applied retroactively,111 this was not necessary in Best 
Products. ll2 The Board had already expressed its wish that Mid-
104. 765 F.2d at 911 n.9. The misrepresentations in Best Products concerned wage 
comparisons, rumors of plant closures, and false reports of NLRB charges. Id. at 909. 
105. Id. at 912. 
106. Id. at 911. 
107. Id. at 906. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 913. 
110. Id. (citing Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 716 (1974)). The 
Supreme Court in Bradley held that when Congress enacted a new statute, it should be 
applied to an issue pending resolution on appeal which would be affected by the statute. 
416 U.S. at 716. The origin of this rule traces back to Justice Marshall's decision in 
United States v. Schooner Peggy in which he stated "[I)f, subsequent to the judgment, 
and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes 
the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied." 1 Cranch 103, 
110 (1801). 
111. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union Local 347, 417 U.S. I, 10 n.lO (1974). 
The union, as charging party, was initially denied reimbursement for attorneys fees by 
the Board. Id. at 3. But while the issue was on appeal the Board changed its policy on 
reimbursement. Id. at 6-7. The Supreme Court noted that it was necessary for the appel-
late court to remand the case back to the Board for its opinion on whether giving the 
change retroactive effect would best effectuate the policies underlying the NLRA. Id. at 
10 n.10. 
112. 765 F.2d at 913. 
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land be applied retroactivelyU3 and the court deferred to that 
wish. H4 
C. THE UNION'S MAJORITY STATUS 
The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected the last of the em-
ployer's objections to the Board's order to bargain. I IIi Best had 
argued that the union had lost its majority status due to em-
ployee turnover.ll6 But the court reasoned that the union en-
joyed an irrebuttable presumption that it represented a majority 
of the employees for a reasonable time, which was found to be 
one year.ll7 This time was measured from the date on which the 
employer began to bargain in good faith. U8 Here the court found 
that the one-year period had not begun to run since Best had 
113. 263 N.L.R.B. at 133 n.24. "In accordance with our usual practice, we shall ap-
ply our new policy not only 'to the case in which the issue arises,' but also 'to all pending 
cases in whatever stage.''' [d. at 133 n.24 (quoting Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 
N.L.R.B. 995, 1006-07 (1958)). 
114. 765 F.2d at 913. In Bradley v. Richmond School Board, an exception to this 
deferral was found to be appropriate in cases where manifest injustice would otherwise 
result. 416 U.S. 696, 716 (1974). The court in Best Products stated that the exception did 
not apply because "no manifest injustice would flow from the decision to abide by the 
Board's policy here." 765 F.2d at 913. 
115. 765 F.2d at 913. 
116. [d. 
117. See, e.g., Financial Inst. Employees of America v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 356, 365 
(9th Cir. 1984). The employer refused to bargain with the certified local union, claiming 
that the local's decision to affiliate with an international union removed the employer's 
duty to bargain. [d. at 358. The Ninth Circuit found that the duty would continue be-
cause the new successor union was not substantially changed by the affiliation. [d. at 361. 
The court reasoned that "the most valued objective of the Act [NLRA] is industrial 
peace" and that this is "more likely to be achieved by maintaining continuity in the 
bargaining structure." [d. at 365 (quoting NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 578 
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981)). In employer refusal to bargain situa-
tions the one year presumption of majority status after initial Board certification is ir-
rebuttable even in the absence of a contract. 752 F.2d at 365. 
118. See, e.g., Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 785 (1962). In Mar-Jac, the union 
won a certification election in November of 1959. [d. at 786. The employer refused to 
bargain, leading to the union filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. On 
August 9, 1960 a settlement agreement was entered into in which the employer agreed to 
bargain in good faith. But on March 29, 1961 the employer petitioned the Board for a 
new election, claiming that the one year period was up and the employer now had a good 
faith doubt that the union continued to represent a majority of the employees. [d. How-
ever, the Board dismissed the petition, holding that the one year period should be mea-
sured from the date that the employer begins to bargain in good faith. [d. at 787. To 
permit the employer to obtain a new election would "allow it to take advantage of its 
own failure to carry out its statutory obligation .... " [d. 
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yet to commence good faith bargaining.1I9 
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
The narrow issue presented to the Ninth Circuit in Best 
Products was how the NLRB should treat misrepresentations by 
unions in election campaigns. The court decided to analyze the 
alleged misrepresentations by Local 428 under the deregulation 
approach put forth by the NLRB in its decision in Midland Na-
tional Life Insurance CO.120 Under this view the election was up-
held, since no forgery or improper Board involvement were 
found. 121 
By adopting the Midland rule, the Ninth Circuit gave its 
stamp of approval to the view that employees pay little atten-
tion to campaign propaganda from either the union or the em-
ployer. Because of this belief, the court felt that misrepresenta-
tions should be largely deregulated and the Board should keep 
its hands off the campaign. By rejecting dilatory attacks on the 
election results and eliminating the need for lengthy hearings on 
misrepresentation challenges, prompt completion of the election 
proceedings will be facilitated. 122 
In this narrow sense the decision in Best Products is a cor-
rect one. To some small extent, adoption of the Midland rule 
will speed up the election procedure and help prevent the abuse 
of Board processes to delay certification. In the past employers 
have often abused Board processes by challenging every minor 
union misrepresentation, reasoning that even unsuccessful chal-
lenges result in certification delays of two to three years.123 On 
the other hand, unions infrequently challenge elections due to 
employer misrepresentations, reasoning that it is much faster to 
119. 765 F.2d at 914. 
120. [d. at 913 (citing Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 
(1982)). 
121. 765 F.2d at 913. 
122. [d. at 912 (citing NLRB v. Berryfast, Inc., 741 F.2d 1161, 1162 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
123. See, e.g., Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1173 (1985); NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc., 
720 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1983); General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978); 
Formco, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 61 (1977); Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962) 
(in each of these leading cases the employer was the party challenging the election claim-
ing misrepresentation by the union). 
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simply wait for the twelve-month election bar to expire and then 
file for a new election than it is to go through the lengthy unfair 
labor practices procedure. 124 Thus the new rule should come to 
be favored by unions and should promote the overall policy of 
the National Labor Relations Act of protecting the right of em-
ployees to self-organize. In addition, the hesitations that other 
circuits have had in applying the Midland rule do not seem to 
apply here. The misrepresentations in Best Products were not 
the sort of artful and deceptive falsehoods that the First and 
Sixth Circuits felt should be excepted from the Midland rule. 12Ci 
But in a broader sense the decision in Best Products repre-
sents a failure of the Ninth Circuit to address a more fundamen-
tal issue raised by this case. Private sector union membership in 
the United States has declined from a peak of near 38% in 1954 
to 21 % in 1980 and the downward trend continues.126 Union 
success rates in certification elections have declined from nearly 
80% in the early 1940S127 to 46.2% in 1981.128 This decline is 
due to a broad range of factors, of which the use of misrepresen-
tations by employers is one part. The decline reflects an upsurge 
in employer union busting efforts and the inability of current 
legislation to successfully protect the right of employees to self-
organize under section 7 of the NLRA, along with the failure of 
the courts and the NLRB to deal with this decline through case 
124. Section 9(c)(3) of the NLRA sets out the election bar rule: "no election shall be 
directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-
month period, a valid election shall have been held." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976). Thus a 
union which loses a representation election in which it alleges that the employer commit-
ted misrepresentations has a choice. It can wait twelve months and file for a new elec-
tion. Or it can file an unfair labor practice charge against the employer alleging campaign 
misrepresentations. If the employer is prepared to carry the appeal process to the limit, 
even if the charge is upheld and the union wins, the procedure often takes two to three 
years. The only Board remedy at the end of this period is an order for a new election and 
the posting of a notice in the workplace that the employer has been found guilty of an 
unfair labor practice. Because of the paucity of this remedy, unions often forego filing an 
unfair labor practice charge and simply wait out the twelve month election bar period. 
125. See Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1173 (1985); NLRB v. New Columbus Nursing Home, Inc., 720 
F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1983); See supra text accompanying notes 50-58 (explanation of the 
facts and holdings of Van Dorn and New Columbus). 
126. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Worker's Rights to Self-Organization 
Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1771 n.4 (1983). 
127. See 7 NLRB Ann. Rep. 88-89 (1942); 8 NLRB Ann. Rep. 96 (1943); 9 NLRB 
Ann. Rep. 86 (1944). 
128. 46 NLRB Ann. Rep. 205 (1981). 
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law.129 The current reality is that the present checks on em-
ployer misconduct do not work and the result is that the em-
ployer who commits the greatest number of violations of the 
NLRA is the most likely to win a certification election.130 
If this trend is to be reversed, and the NLRA's goal of en-
suring employee free choice in election campaigns furthered, 
then much more fundamental election reform is needed than a 
simple return to the old Shopping Kart Food Market stan-
dard. 131 Professors Getman and Goldman, upon whose study the 
Midland rule was based, proposed a number of campaign re-
forms in addition to deregulation of election propaganda. These 
proposals included shifting the burden of proof in discrimina-
tory discharge cases during election campaigns to the employer 
and requiring mandatory injunctions against them, triple back 
pay remedies, and denial of government contracts to recidivist 
employers.132 Another academic expert has further proposed 
that unions be given a chance to respond on company time and 
premises to employer captive audience speeches and tha,t union 
organizers be allowed greater access to the employer's prem-
ises.133 In adopting Midland's deregulation without the accom-
panying reforms to strengthen and expedite the sanctions 
against illegal speech or action, the Ninth Circuit has taken the 
heart out of Getman and Goldberg's proposed reforms. 
129. See generally Pressures In Today's Workplace, Ouersight Hearings Before 
The Subcommittee On Labor-Management Relations Of The House Committee On Ed-
ucation And Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 408-42 (1979) (statement of Robert A. Geor-
gine, President of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO). 
Georgine discusses the growth of union-busting during the 1970s and details the methods 
by which employers utilize attorneys and labor relations consultants to openly flaunt the 
law. See infra text accompanying notes 131-37. 
130. Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionists Point 
of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1191 (1976). 
131. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). See generally Eames, supra note 130 and infra not':! 
133: Weiler, supra note 126 and infra note 133. 
132. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG. & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW 
AND REALITY 155-56 (1976). 
133. Eames, supra note 130, at 1192. Eames criticized the Getman and Goldberg 
study upon which the Midland rule was based. She argued that instead of focusing upon 
the 81 ~;, of the employees who had already made up their minds about how to vote, the 
19% remaining should be examined because their votes often determine who wins the 
election. Id. at 1186. While this 19% statistical difference was thought by Getman and 
Goldberg to be statistically insignificant, Weiler noted that a shift of only two percent in 
the total number of votes cast in the elections studied, if carefully allocated, would have 
led to a 100~;, increase in the number of union victories. Weiler, supra note 126, at 1784-
85. 
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However, even these reforms may be ineffective because the 
incentives for employer violations are too great to be blunted by 
such changes.13• As an alternative means of reducing the oppor-
tunities for violations, the entire election campaign could be 
eliminated. l3II Once a union obtains an authorization card major-
ity, certification could be granted either automatically or upon 
victory in an immediate election.136 This would eliminate the op-
portunity for a professionally run anti-union campaign replete 
with misrepresentations and unfair labor practices.137 This is es-
sentially the procedure used in the Canadian labor law system. 
In Canada, dispensing with the protracted campaign has elimi-
nated most of the chances for illegal intimidation and reduced 
the rate of employer unfair labor practices to a fraction of the 
American rate.136 
The kinds of reforms proposed here would require extensive 
legislative changes in the NLRA and a greater willingness on the 
part of the courts and the NLRB to face up to and deal with the 
decline in unionization in the U.S. It is true that the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Best Products could not rewrite the NLRA by itself. 
However, given the wide latitude in interpreting and fleshing out 
the basic guidelines of the NLRA granted to the NLRB and the 
courts by Congress, the Ninth Circuit could certainly have done 
more than seek refuge in the hands-off approach of Best 
Products. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Best Products Co. 
has set a clear standard by which both employers and unions 
can judge their campaign statements. By limiting to the use of 
forged documents the grounds upon which misrepresentations 
will be held to be unfair labor practices, the court has set forth a 
rule which will help prevent dilatory attacks on election results 
and will speed up the certification process. But in adopting de-
regulation without recognizing the need for still further reforms 
the court has ignored the much more fundamental problem of 
134. Weiler, supra note 126, at 1804. 
135. [d. at 1804-22. 
136. [d. at 1805. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. at 1821. 
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how to truly further the NLRA's goal of ensuring employees' 
rights to self-organize. 
Jeffrey L. Henze* 
"Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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